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We generalize the Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) methodology for estimating the costs that could
reconcile international portfolio holdings with CAPM predictions. First, we simultaneously
estimate inward and outward investment costs and even interactions between home and host
country. Second, the risk aversion parameter is estimated rather than postulated. Third, we
detect costs for domestic investments. We ¯nd that the home bias in equity portfolios is related
to a mixture of market frictions, such as information asymmetries, institutional factors and
explicit costs. Over the period 2001-2004, the average implicit investment costs range from
0.26 (US) to 16 (Turkey) percent per annum.
JEL classi¯cation: G11, G15, F36
Keywords: international portfolio diversi¯cation, information asymmetries, international
CAPMIn this paper we build on Cooper and Kaplanis' (CK, 1994) idea of estimating a set of dead-
weight costs that can reconcile actual international portfolio weights with the predictions of the
International CAPM (InCAPM). The CK approach provides point estimates of each country's
cost of either inward or outward investments, conditional on a postulated value of relative risk
aversion. In contrast, we adopt a regression approach: home bias depends on deadweight costs
which, in turn, depend on regressors related to international transaction and information costs.
The key advantage of this route is that we can measure far more. First, we can estimate simul-
taneously a home-country cost vector, a host-country one, and even interactions, thus ending
up with a complete matrix of costs for all combinations of home and host countries. Second,
we are able to estimate relative risk aversion rather than having to assume one. Third, we get
more than just point estimates: we can in fact distinguish between coincidences or transient
factors and more substantial ones, and we can therefore obtain con¯dence intervals and signif-
icance tests as to both the level of the implied overall deadweight costs and the contribution of
the various variables to those overall costs. Fourth, we allow for costs of domestic investment
too; and while we can still only estimate the di®erential cost of investing abroad versus at
home, we are able to demonstrate that the domestic-investment cost does vary over countries
and years and, therefore, is non-zero. The existence of such a cost may explain part of the
equity premium puzzle or the divergence between risk-aversion estimates from mean returns
versus from intertemporal studies or in°ation-hedging asset demand. Fifth, we do not have to
assume that the capitalization of domestic equity equals the wealth of a country. Lastly, in
our computations we also tie up some loose ends in the original CK methodology, like the role
of ¯xed-interest securities denominated in the various currencies.
None of this would have been possible without the better data that have become available
since CK's work. We were also inspired by recent work on home bias|Berkel (2004), Coval
and Moskowitz (1999), Faruqee, Lee and Yan (2004), or Portes and Rey (1999)|that tries
to directly explain capital °ows or deviations between actual portfolio holdings and InCAPM
predictions. In a way, we even merge both approaches. Conducting this type of research ¯rmly
within portfolio theory instead of via stand-alone regression o®ers a neat and rigorous way of
controlling for expectations, to which mean-variance portfolio weights are very sensitive, and
for the correlations between each and every country's index. Also, our two-layer approach,where the regressors a®ect portfolio choices via an implied cost, solves a thorny issue of how
to specify the regression. Portfolio theory tells us that, if the information and cost regressors
are to bear only on one home and one host country, the left-hand side variable should not
be deviations between observed and predicted portfolio weights, nor percentage deviations
between these, but di®erences between covariance risks of assets relative to two imperfectly
diversi¯ed portfolios. This speci¯cation is not only better grounded in theory, but performs
substantially better in practice too.
We ¯nd that the implied extra costs of foreign investments vary widely across countries, with
plausibly modest ¯gures for established market economies and much higher costs for emerging
countries. Over the sample period, the estimates of the deadweight costs of exporting capital
range between 0.26 percent (US) and 16 percent (Turkey). Informal, information-related costs
play a much larger role than explicit cash items like trading costs. Longitudinal replication of
the original CK method shows that costs have, generally, come down as one would expect.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In the ¯rst section, we explain the
methodology. In Section 2, we describe our data and motivate our choice for the variables
a®ecting international investment costs. Section 3 discusses the empirical results.
I. The Model
Following Cooper and Kaplanis (CK, 1994), we consider a world with N countries and N
currencies. Nominal returns are measured in terms of the Nth currency. There are N equity-
index assets, N ¡ 1 ¯xed-interest foreign-currency assets and one risk-free domestic security,
asset 2N. The ordering of the countries is the same for the equity-index assets and currency
assets, and both stock prices and exchange rates are risky processes. For each country l, there is
a representative investor with a homothetic utility function. We assume that when an investor
from country l holds stocks from country i, he experiences a proportional deadweight loss of
Cl
idt in the period dt. This allows the costs of holding stocks to vary by investor and by asset.











dt + ¾idzi; i = 1;:::;2N ¡ 1; (1)
2where ¹i and ¾i are the annualized expectation and standard deviation of the nominal rate of
return on this asset respectively, and dzi is the increment to a standard Wiener process. For
notational convenience, dividends and foreign interest are assumed to be capitalized, so that
they are included in ¹.




Pl = ¦ldt + ¾l
¼dzl
¼; l = 1;:::;N; (2)
where ¦l and ¾l
¼ are the annualized expected value and the standard deviation of the instan-
taneous rate of in°ation and dzl
¼ is the increment to a standard Wiener process. Under these
assumptions, the optimal portfolio weights of risky assets for any investor l are
xl = ® ­¡1
³
¹ ¡ r1 ¡ Cl
´
+ (1 ¡ ®)­¡1wl; (3)
where
xl =(2N ¡ 1) £ 1 vector of the proportions of investor l's wealth invested in each risky asset
® = relative risk tolerance
­ = (2N ¡ 1) £ (2N ¡ 1) p.a. covariance matrix of the nominal rates of return on the risky
securities
1 =(2N ¡ 1) £ 1 vector of elements all equal to unity
wl = (2N ¡ 1) £ 1 vector of covariances of the risky asset returns with investor l's rate of
in°ation.
We now extract the demand for stocks from the above demand equations. Following Sercu














where ­S is the covariance matrix of the N stocks and ­X is the covariance matrix of the
N ¡ 1 exchange-rate changes. Familiarly, the inverse of the partitioned covariance matrix can


















where ¡0 is a N£(N¡1) matrix, each row containing the (N ¡ 1) multivariate slope coe±cients
in the regression of the equity return indices on all exchange rate changes and ­SjX is the N£N
covariance matrix of the errors of these N regressions. ¡ is the matrix of Stein (1961), Johnson
(1960) hedge ratios and ­SjX is thus the covariance matrix of the stock returns hedged against
exchange risk. This means that we can rewrite the ¯rst N rows in equation (3) as
xl







+ (1 ¡ ®)­¡1
SjXwl
SjX; (4)
with Re;S the vector of excess equity returns, Re;X the vector of excess currency returns
(including foreign interest) and wl
SjX the vector of the covariances of investor l's rate of in°ation
with the N hedged stock returns.
In the OECD data used by CK, only one element of a country's xl
n is available, the own-country
investment. So they have in total N observations to estimate potentially N2 pairwise costs. As
a result of these data limitations they can either estimate inward costs, or outward costs, but
never both simultaneously, and surely no interactions. We, in contrast, have a full N £N data
matrix, which would enable us to compute an unconstrained N £ N matrix of costs. Those,
however, would just be point estimates with zero degrees of freedom. We prefer a regression
structure that leaves us degrees of freedom, and allows us to distinguish between coincidences
or transient factors and more substantial ones.
The deadweight costs of investing abroad have three sources. The ¯rst component is home-
country related (the l-th home e®ect), including primarily the shadow cost of controls on capital
out°ows. The second component is related to the host country (the i-th foreign e®ect), like
trading costs and the impact of capital import controls. The third component is an interaction
e®ect; for instance, withholding costs as laid down in bilateral tax treaties are speci¯c for the
pair (i; l). But we also recognize that domestic investments may have nonzero costs, even
though they are likely to be substantially lower than the costs of international investments.
For riskfree lending and borrowing, lastly, there is assumed to be no cost. Below, we denote
variables that are correlated with international costs by hl (for the home variables), fi (for
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D(dl) ; if i · N and i = l; (domestic stocks)
C(hl; fi; al;i) ; if i · N and i 6= l; (foreign stocks)
0 ; if i > N (¯xed-interest):
The demand model in Equation (4) is not yet suited for regression analysis since every single
observation xl
i depends on expected returns and costs for all host countries i simultaneously.
Also, expectations and hedge ratios ¡ are hard to estimate. Obtaining an equation where each
left-hand-side observation depends just on one Cl
i, rather than on all, is possible by studying
covariances with l's portfolio rather l's portfolio weights themselves. We simply premultiply
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which says that the covariance of asset i's return with the return of the portfolio chosen by
investor l is linearly related to the net return of the hedged stock and the covariance of the
hedged stock return with investor l's in°ation rate. Equation (5) gives us a structure where
each yl
i depends only on the costs of °ows from home l to host i, not to other hosts k. Our
procedure also takes into account all (co)variances in a structured and parsimonous way. In
contrast, in a simple regression analysis of xl
is one can, at best, bring in just the (co)variances
for l and i as regressors, and in an additive way. As a welcome byproduct, bringing ­SjX to
the left-hand side has also incorporated the estimation errors that are present in b ­ into the
regressand instead of the regressor.
We now eliminate the expectations and gammas. Below, we write the equation for residence
country l and host country i, we compare it to the equation for residence country i and asset
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Eliminating expectations by taking (i; i) as the benchmark instead of the world average, as is
standard, very much simpli¯es the regression without any extra loss of degrees of freedom. With
20 regressors and 40 countries, introducing the mean cost would have been quite cumbersome.
II. Data
Data on international portfolio holdings are from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey
(CPIS), conducted annually by the IMF since 2001. For each participating country, the CPIS
reports data on foreign equity portfolio holdings by residence of the issuer. The CPIS data
substantially reduces the data shortcomings that existed during earlier decades. However,
problems with the CPIS data can arise for at least two reasons. First, a number of countries
did not participate to the CPIS resulting in a incomplete country coverage. Among those non-
participants are for example China and the Arab countries. Second, there can be an issue of
under-reporting by CPIS participants. The German survey for example did not cover holdings
by households unless they are managed by a professional. Other problems are related to data
on country characteristics. Out of the 70 countries participating the CPIS in 2004, only 36
could be retained in this study due to missing data in Datastream.
Table I shows the relative importance of each stock market compared to the world market
capitalization and the proportion of domestic equity held in the total equity portfolio at the
end of 2004.1 The home bias can be obtained by subtracting the former from the latter.
To calculate the returns on the equity markets, we composed a value-weighted index for each
country containing all domestic stocks. Stock data are from an international equity list from
1Data for 2001, 2002 and 2003 are similar and can be obtained from the corresponding author.
6Table I: Home bias in equity portfolios based on CPIS data, December 2004.
Portfolio holdings data are from the CPIS. Market capitalizations are from Datastream. The home
bias in equity portfolios is calculated by subtracting the proportional market capitalization from the
proportion of domestic equities in a countries portfolio.
Market capitalization % of equity
Country as a percentage of portfolio in Home Bias
total domestic equities
Austria 0.25 62.15 61.90
Belgium 0.80 71.02 70.22
Brazil 0.93 99.48 98.55
Canada 3.33 76.97 73.63
Chile 0.33 95.39 95.06
Colombia 0.07 99.33 99.26
Czech Republic 0.15 96.59 96.44
Denmark 0.44 68.15 67.71
Finland 0.52 70.99 70.47
France 6.60 84.11 77.52
Germany 3.38 73.91 70.53
Greece 0.34 96.47 96.13
Hong Kong 2.44 91.43 88.99
Hungary 0.08 96.35 96.27
Indonesia 0.21 99.96 99.75
Israel 0.26 94.84 94.58
Italy 2.23 81.58 79.35
Japan 10.07 90.76 80.70
Korea 1.10 98.76 97.65
Malaysia 0.51 99.47 98.95
Netherlands 1.53 37.17 35.64
Norway 0.40 51.10 55.94
Philippines 0.08 99.43 99.35
Poland 0.20 99.46 99.26
Portugal 0.31 90.88 90.57
Russia 0.58 99.96 99.38
Singapore 0.62 81.03 80.41
South Africa 1.25 90.46 89.21
Spain 2.66 92.05 89.39
Sweden 1.07 67.94 66.87
Switzerland 2.34 79.92 77.58
Thailand 0.33 99.52 99.19
Turkey 0.28 99.90 99.62
United Kingdom 8.11 74.66 66.55
United States 46.19 88.09 41.90
Venezuela 0.02 99.71 99.69
TOTAL 100.00
Datastream, developed by Lieven De Moor (2004) that contains data from 1980 to December
2000. Stock prices after December 2000 are from the Morgan Stanley International Country
Indices. All stock prices and CPI are in USD. We use ten years of monthly data to calculate
the conditional covariances of risky asset returns and in°ation rates.
7A detailed description of and motivation for the variables that are used to estimate the costs of
international investment is listed below. We subdivide each set of regressors into four groups:
one related to implicit costs from information asymmetries; a second related to explicit trading
costs and direct controls on international capital °ows; a third measures of ¯nancial develop-
ment, which probably correlate negatively with both information asymmetry and transaction
costs; and, a fourth measures the skewness of the return of the host country. Most of the vari-
ables have been used before, notably by Berkel (2004), Coval and Moskowitz (1999), Faruqee,
Lee and Yan (2004), or Portes and Rey (1999).
A. Implicit, information-related frictions
Information about the domestic economy can be acquired at a lowish cost by regular reading
of the local press and normal business activities, while information about foreign economies
is more di±cult to acquire (e.g. subscriptions to foreign newspapers or translations, Brennan
and Cao, 1997). French and Poterba (1991) show empirically that the e®ects of information
asymmetries between countries on the portfolio composition are similar to those of a return
gap of several basis points between domestic and foreign markets. Information asymmetries
between countries still exist today, despite the existence of internet and satellites that allow
almost instantaneous communication between countries. Portes and Rey (1999) study the
determinants of international equity °ows. They ¯nd that market size, e±ciency of transac-
tions and distance are the most important determinants of transaction °ows. They show that
distance has all the symptoms of being a proxy for information asymmetries and conclude
that the market segmentation is mainly caused by asymmetric information between investors
rather than by transaction costs. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1998, 1999) suggest
that company ownership is more dispersed in countries with a good legal protection of minor-
ity shareholders. Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003) show that di®erences in
corporate governance across countries can partly explain the home bias. Additionally, Erb,
Harvey and Viskanta (1996) show that political risk measures contain some information on
asset returns, at least for emerging markets. In a recent empirical study, Goetzmann and
Kumar (2005) explain underdiversi¯cation by investor-speci¯c characteristics. Using a sample
of 40,000 US private investors, they ¯nd that age and income correlates positively with the
8level of portfolio diversi¯cation. Over-con¯dence and familiarity or local bias leads to under-
diversi¯cation. Neither transaction costs nor data acquisition costs do not signi¯cantly limit
portfolio selection. Instead, the real challenge is to transform data into information.
In this paper we assume information costs to be a broad category of market frictions. They not
only contain adverse selection e®ects (e®ects of information asymmetries on expected returns),
but also the e®ects of information asymmetries on the variance of the returns that result from
di®erent risk perceptions between domestic and foreign investors.
Information costs can not be measured or quanti¯ed directly; therefore we introduce a number
of variables that can approximate either the ease with which information can be obtained or
the complexity of the situation.
A.1 Host-related information variables fi in C(h;f;a)
Host-country GDP. Large, rich countries are more likely to be considered as attractive because
in general investors hear more about them and have more con¯dence in them. For example,
Faruqee, Li and Yan (2004) show that market size, measured by the GDP and the number of
publicly listed companies, signi¯cantly in°uences international portfolio holdings. We expect
that the GDP of the host country has a negative correlation with investment costs.
English-language dummy. We add an indicator that equals unity if the country of host has
English as o±cial language. English being the dominant world language, information °ows
more easily from these countries than towards them, so this lowers the cost of investing into
them.
The next three items refer not to information availability but to the degree of uncertainty (and
hence potential information asymmetry and adverse selection):
Host-country misery index. A country's misery index is the sum of its in°ation and unem-
ployment rates. Initiated by Robert Barro in the 1970's, it measures a country's degree of
macro-economic distress, which adds to uncertainty about future policy and hence to infor-
mation costs. (It could also be interpreted as a \sentiment" variable, but the distinction with
adverse selection is subtle, here.) So we expect that the higher the misery index for a country,
the higher the implicit costs to invest into that country.
9Financial-crisis indicator. Some countries su®ered from a ¯nancial crisis in the recent past:
Brazil (1999), the Asian countries (1997), Russia (1998) and Venezuela (1997). For the host
country, a recent crisis adds to uncertainty and increases the shadow cost of investing to them.
Host-country GDP growth. GDP-growth of the host country is measured as the mean rate over
the preceding three years. Its e®ect on investment costs is uncertain. Everything else being
the same, we expect fast growing countries to be more attractive to international investment if
\sentiment" plays a role. However, high growth may mean more uncertainty and hence higher
information and adverse-selection costs. For one thing, most fast growing countries are also
emerging countries, about which information is scarce and where uncertainties are often large.
In addition, high expected growth leads to high stock-price multiples, which makes markets
quite sensitive to variations in expected growth.2
Political risk measure. We add two variables to account for the political risk of the host country.
The Opacity index developed by PricewaterhouseCoopers is an average of ¯ve risk measures: a
corruption-indicator, a measure for legal and judicial opacity (including shareholder rights), an
indicator of economic and policy opacity, an indicator for accounting or corporate governance
opacity and a factor that refers to the impact of regulatory opacity and uncertainty.3 High
values on the opacity index indicate a lack of clear, accurate and widely accepted practices in
capital markets, thus we expect the opacity index of the host country to correlate positively
with investment costs. A second political risk indicator is the International Country Risk
Guide Political Risk Index (ICRGP) published in Erb et al. (1996). It contains 13 political risk
factors like indicators of political leadership, political terrorism, economic planning failures and
divergences between economic expectations and reality. Higher values on this index indicate
low political risk, thus we expect this variable to correlate negatively with investment costs.
2Consider for instance the Gordon model, which says that the prospective price-earnings ratio is Pt= ^ Xt+1 =
1=(R¡g), with R the discount rate and g the growth rate. The growth elasticity of P/E then equals g=(R¡g),
which rises sharply in g.
3www.opacityindex.com.
10A.2 Interaction-type information variables ai;l in C(h;f;a)
Distance. Following Portes and Rey (1999), Coval and Moskowitz (1999) and Berkel (2004),
we use the physical distance between countries as a ¯rst proxy for the costs of obtaining
information about foreign markets. The distance between countries is calculated following
the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the most important cities or
agglomerations (in terms of population). Our source is the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et
d'Informations Internationales (CEPII).
Common-language indicator. Countries that share a common language have a potential in-
formation advantage on countries where the languages are di®erent. We include a dummy
variable which is equal to unity if two countries share a common language, and expect it to
have a negative e®ect on the costs of international investments. The language dummies are
also from CEPII.
Same-region indicator. Following a similar reasoning as for language, dummy variables are
added to account for whether two countries are situated in the same region. As in Berkel (2004),
we classify the countries by region and construct region dummies. The regional classi¯cation
of the countries can be found in the Appendix.
Euroland indicator. Lastly, we create a Euro-dummy for the ten countries in our sample that
share the same currency. Since the introduction of the ¯xed exchange rate on January 1,
1999, the level of ¯nancial integration between the member countries has increased due to the
absence of exchange rate risk, the increase of in cross-country banking, and the reduction of
transaction costs. Thus we should expect that the asymmetry of information between those
countries has reduced.
There is a wide range of other variables that one can think of being a proxy for information
asymmetries. For example, we have worked with an index of insider trading, a US dummy,
a dummy variable for countries that have a common colonial background, share a border or
belong to the same legal family. Our ¯nal selection was based on multicollinearity issues and,
of course, signi¯cance and statistical ¯t of the data.
11A.3 Home-related information variables dl and hl
While we can only measure the di®erence between foreign- and home-investment costs, we can
still add control variables that could pick up circumstances where domestic costs are higher or
lower than average. This eliminates noise from the C estimates, and also provides information
as to whether domestic-investment information costs do vary; if so, this ¯nding would con¯rm
these costs are non-zero. An increase in domestic costs D(d) has the same e®ect as a fall in
foreign costs C(h;f;a).
The home-related information costs mirror the host-related variables: Home-country GDP is
a more ambivalent variable than the host country's GDP. On the one hand, world leaders are
often also the countries with a high level of technological and ¯nancial development, which
makes it easier and cheaper for investors to obtain information and do the actual investments
abroad. This has a downward e®ect on foreign investment costs, mirroring the e®ect of a small
host GDP. On the other hand, large economies tend to be more introvert. One argument is
that investors from large economies have better diversi¯cation opportunities inside their own
country already, making international diversi¯cation less necessary. True, this e®ect should
already be picked up by the variance-covariance matrix that is incorporated into our dependent
variable. But there is likely to be an interaction with information processing too. Residents
from, say, Luxembourg, do not need quite as much time to digest all relevant local news as US
portfolio managers, so they naturally spend more of their day on foreign news. This e®ect is
not picked up by the covariance matrix, and would make small countries more extravert than
large ones even after accounting for (co)variance e®ects.
There is less ambivalence with the other variables. A high value for the home-country misery
index and the home-country opacity index and a low value for the home-country ICRGP-index
increases the uncertainty about domestic assets, thus increasing home investment costs and
decreasing the net extra cost of foreign investments, everything else being the same. The same
holds in case of a unit value for the domestic ¯nancial-crisis indicator, signaling a recent crisis
in the home country. So we expect that a high value for the domestic misery index, or a recent
crisis, lowers the di®erential information cost of moving funds out.
Our second group of regressors, after these related to information costs, refer to explicit fric-
12tions.
B. Explicit frictions: transaction costs and capital restrictions
The items not related to information costs consist of estimated direct costs of trading, and the
shadow cost of quantitative restrictions.
B.1 Trading costs.
Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (2001) report the trading costs for a wide range of countries
between 1996 and 1998. They show that emerging markets have signi¯cantly higher transac-
tion costs. This large trading-cost di®erential between developed and emerging markets can
limit the gains from international diversi¯cation. We use transaction cost data provided by
Elkins/McSherry Co., Inc., published in Institutional Investor and Degryse and Van Achter
(2002). For the Russian Federation there was no data available, so we approximated the
transaction costs in Russia by the average of trading costs in the Czech Republic, Poland and
Hungary.
Foreign trading costs are expected to be positively correlated with the costs of foreign invest-
ment Cl
i(). Domestic trading costs are ambivalent. On the one hand, when domestic trading
costs are high, it is more attractive to invest in another country if trading costs are lower
there. On the other hand, foreign investments are often routed through domestic brokers; so
for residents of countries with high transaction costs also outward investments are likely to be
expensive. That is, it is possible that they add to both Dl() and Cl
i(), leaving only a small or
zero impact on the net cost di®erential.
The second group of explicit frictions are the e®ects of controls on international capital °ows.
B.2 Direct controls on capital °ows.
Although the incidence of capital controls has dwindled since the eighties, they are still around,
especially in less developed economies. In periods of ¯nancial crisis, some countries have re-
instated such restrictions. Malaysia, for example, had a comparatively liberal investment
regime before 1998, but in 1998-1999 a wide range of direct capital and exchange controls was
13introduced with the aim of restricting the supply of ringgits to speculators and preventing
heavy capital out°ows by residents and nonresidents.
A large number of studies have tried to measure the level of capital account openness (see
Minaine (2004) for an overview). Most measures rely on the 0/1 dummies provided by the
IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER),
such as the index of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001). Unfortunately, this capital-openness
measure hardly takes the intensity of capital controls into account, and tries to summarize
restrictions on both in°ows and out°ows by one single number. Edison and Warnock (2003)
compute the ratio of total market capitalization of stocks available to foreign investors over
total market capitalization, but this index captures only one aspect of the intensity of capital
controls, is available only for certain emerging countries and does not provide any information
on restrictions on out°ows. We want a separate index for outward and inward controls, with
maximal country coverage. Thus from the AREAER dummies we develop two new indices
ourselves, one for in°ows and one for out°ows, by counting how many of 15 possible restrictions
were adopted by the country. Details on the construction of our measures of capital controls
can be found in the Appendix. Obviously, capital controls on both in°ows and on out°ows are
expected to have a positive impact on the costs on international investment.
Our third group of regressors refer to measures of ¯nancial development
C. Financial development
Channeling savings to where they can be invested most e±ciently requires established payment
systems; the availability of information on the economy, the companies and the asset prices;
and a way to manage and to control risk. Equity prices are more informative in well developed
¯nancial markets. Thus, ¯nancial development is likely to be associated with both lower
information costs and lower explicit frictions.
Common measures for ¯nancial development are the ratio of private credit provided by the
banking sector to GDP or the ratio of M2 to GDP. These measures focus on the banking
sector. They might not be appropriate to measure ¯nancial development of the equity markets
because a well developed or very large banking sector does not always imply that the equity
14markets are well developed. In fact, banking and stock markets can be substitutes|think of
Germany. Therefore, we create a new measure that is equal to the sum of domestic credit
provided by the banking sector and stock market capitalization divided by GDP. Market cap
is obtained from Datastream, and annual data on the domestic credit provided by the banking
sector are from World Development Indicators.
Stock-market liquidity is known to be a major determinant of bid-ask spread in order-driven
markets, and of price pressure in price-driven markets. But it is also correlated with volatility
and the prevalence of insider trading, two information-related variables. Either way, a high
liquidity lowers costs. So higher host-country liquidity lowers the total expense of investing
there, and higher domestic liquidity increases comparative outward costs. We measure liquidity
as the ratio of annual turnover over market capitalization. Annual turnover is obtained from
Datastream.
We lastly turn to a variable to capture the skewness in stock returns.
D. Return skewness
Finally, we add standardized skewness for the return of the host-country, to capture non-
gaussian features in the distribution. We expect that investors prefer positive skewness in
returns, thus this variable is expected to have a negative e®ect on investment costs.
Table II summarizes the variables that are used to estimate the costs of international invest-
ment, together with their expected sign of correlation with these costs.
III. Estimation and Results
A. Estimation
The test equation (7) has as its left-hand side variable the di®erential portfolio covariance risks
of asset i for investors l and i, and on the right the net cost di®erential NC(Hl;t;Fi;t;Al;i;t;Dl;t)











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16where Hl;t;Fi;t;Al;i;t and Dl;t are vectors containing the sources of home-related costs, host-
related costs, interaction-type costs and domestic costs respectively.
We specify the costs of international investment as an exponential function of the above re-
gressors. This guarantees that ¯tted costs end up as positive numbers. It also minimizes the
impact of the estimate of risk tolerance on the estimated coe±cients. Indeed, only the con-
stant in the exponent (c; below) must be inferred using the estimate of ® obtained from the
in°ation-covariance terms; the other coe±cients of the cost function are not directly a®ected




































where c = c + log(®) and X = [H;F;A;D].
We estimate equation (8) using the General Method of Moments (GMM) with a Newey-West
weighted covariance matrix such that the GMM-estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation. All right hand sides variables of equation (8) are used as instruments. We
estimate the model on the full sample 2001-2004 and on two subsamples 2001-2002 and 2003-
2004. As a robustness check, we also test the model imposing a simple linear cost structure.
B. Empirical Results
Table III summarizes the estimation results of equation (8) for the full sample and the two
subsamples. First note the general explanatory power: of the variance of the ¢yl
i;t observations,
74 percent is explained. This compares favorably with direct regression analysis of ¢xl
i;t
numbers, like in Berkel (2004), where R2s obtained with very similar regressors are between
15 and 25 percent. Stated di®erently, a substantial part of the variation in investment biases
xl
i;t ¡ xi;t, the variable studied by Berkel, is related to variance-covariance e®ects, and once
this is sorted out the remaining di®erential covariance risks yl ¡ yi can be well explained by
the regressors.
Our second introductory observation is that, across the years, there is a reassuring degree
of consistence in the values of the coe±cients and the patterns of signi¯cance/insigni¯cance.
Third, relative risk aversion is estimated to be signi¯cantly positive. As ® is not signi¯cantly
17di®erent from unity, we ¯nd, similar as CK, that the in°ation-hedging component does not seem
to explain much. However, in the linear model, ® is signi¯cantly di®erent from unity which
suggests that the in°ation hedging factor can not be ignored entirely. Signi¯cant risk tolerance
of course means a signi¯cant estimated relative risk aversion. Our estimates of relative risk
aversion range between 0.9 and 1.1, or, when we use year-by-year estimation (not shown),
between 2.2 and .8. This is low relative to estimates from expected returns; but gross expected
returns are suspect if there are trading and information costs. Our numbers are in line with
Lucas (2003), who approaches relative risk aversion from the relation between real interest
rates and real consumption growth and calculates that relative risk aversion cannot be higher
than 2.5, and with the estimates by Apte et al. (2004), extracted from real exchange rates and
real consumption data. The alternative of ¯xing relative risk aversion at some predetermined
level, as in CK, has the drawback that its estimation error margin is ignored in the t-tests for
the other regressors, which would have overstated the signi¯cance levels.
The main interest is, of course, in the determinants and levels of transaction costs. We discuss
these in turn.
B.1 Determinants of costs
Information-related frictions signi¯cantly in°uence implicit deadweight costs during the sample
period: ¯fteen out of sixteen information-related variables turn out to be signi¯cant. Among
the host-country regressors that are expected to correlate with costs of investing abroad, the
misery index, the opacity index, GDP growth, and crisis variables are signi¯cant and have
positive coe±cients, suggesting that they all increase uncertainty and the costs that go with
it. Host-country GDP and the English-language indicator both come up with a signi¯cantly
negative sign, as expected, but the English language indicator is no longer signi¯cant in the
subsamples. The two political risk variables show contradicting evidence and the ICRGP-index
has varying impact across the three estimations. One reason seems to be that the variables
are too similar and cause multicollinearity problems: when we drop the PwC opacity measure
(not shown), the coe±cient for ICRGP behaves as expected.
On the home-country side, the signs mirror those for the host: GDP comes up with a posi-


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































19can be explained by variances and covariances and despite their presumably well-developed
information and trading machineries. Again consistent with information costs (domestic, this
time), the misery index, the opacity index and the crisis indicator come up with a signi¯cantly
negative sign.
All four interaction variables are signi¯cant, with the expected signs: sharing the same language
or living in the same region reduces information costs while information costs are higher if the
physical distance between the host and the home country increases. On top of the region-e®ect
there is an information advantage for members of the Euro-area.
The level of development of the ¯nancial markets of the host country does in°uence implicit
investment costs. We ¯nd that \outside" corporate ¯nancing as a fraction of GDP in the host
country clearly decreases the costs of investing into that market, as logic suggests. Puzzlingly
however, the host liquidity variable comes up with systematically signi¯cant coe±cients of
the wrong sign. For the full sample, we ¯nd that high trading costs in the home or the host
country are positively correlated with higher di®erential international investment costs, but the
evidence is indicative only, while in the 2003-2004 subsample, trading costs in the host country
come up with a negative sign, which is not what one would normally expect. However, when
we estimate the model with transaction costs as the single explanatory variable, the coe±cient
for trading costs in the home country becomes (insigni¯cantly) negative, while trading costs in
the host country come up with a signi¯cantly positive sign. In short, the unexpected signs for
trading costs in the full regression seems to due to unexpected interactions with other variables.
These results are consistent with Goetzmann and Kumar (2005), who ¯nd that transaction
costs do not noticeably in°uence diversi¯cation decisions. In their study diversi¯cation choices
are explained by investor speci¯c characteristics. Here, the clearest explicit frictions in the
case of inward investment costs turn out to be those caused by controls on capital imports,
not transaction costs. Restrictions on capital exports have no clear e®ect.
Unexpectedly, the skewness indicator has a consistently positive signi¯cant sign. A potential
explanation can be found in Bekaert, Erb, Harvey and Viskanta (1998): skewness is typical for
emerging markets, and also changes over time, thus creating extra uncertainty.
There are two broad conclusions, at this stage. First, information variables are clearly impor-
tant, with signs for their coe±cients that make sense, while transaction costs and liquidity are
20often insigni¯cant or come up with signs that must mean they are proxying for something else.
Second, home-country information variables do play a role, consistent with the idea that also
in home markets there are information costs.
B.2 Estimated cost levels and trends
Table IV in the Appendix shows the full 36£36 matrix of estimated total costs of international
investment for December 2004; tables for the other years are similar and can be obtained from
the corresponding author. As a more digestible summary of the table, Figure 1 shows the
estimated annual percentage cost to invest into a particular host country during the sample
period, averaged across all home countries over the four years. It is clear from the ¯gure that
there is a huge di®erence between the international investment costs into the industrialized and
the developing countries. Over the sample period, the average implicit inward investment costs
into the developed countries range from only 0.26 per cent per annum in the United States
to 2.8 percent per annum in Greece. Investment into developing countries resulted in a much
higher implicit cost, and much more variability: average inward investment costs amounted
to 3.5 percent per annum for Hungary, but investing in Turkey went with an average implicit
investment cost estimated at 16 percent per annum.
Figure 2 shows the average inward investment costs for each country and each subperiod relative
to the mean inward investment cost. The ranking of the countries based on inward investment
costs does not di®er much over the two subperiods. For the years 2001-2002 the top ¯ve of
lowest inward investment costs countries is composed of the US, Hong Kong, Switzerland,
the UK and Germany, while the top ¯ve countries for the years 2003-2004 are the US, the
Netherlands, Switzerland, Canada and the UK. High- investment-cost countries are Turkey,
the Russian Federation, Indonesia and Venezuela, for both subperiods.
Four years is a short period to verify whether costs have come down over time, so to get an idea
of the evolution the implicit costs of international investment we apply the original the CK
methodology for the nine countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain, Sweden,
the UK and the US) in their sample that have data on xl
l over the period 1980-1997 (OECD
data). We add the xl
l data from the IMF surveys to extend the series. The risk tolerance
parameter is ¯xed at 1.067, for comparability with our estimates.
21Figure 1: Annual average inward investment costs, 2001-2004
Figure 2: Inward investment costs relative to the mean per subperiod
Average inward investment costs divided by the mean inward investment cost for each subperiod
22Figure 3: Evolution of annual inward investment costs, ® = 1:067
Annual inward investment costs are calculated following the CK (1996) methodology. Data on portfolio
holdings until 1997 are from the OECD. No data is available for the period 1998-2000
23Figure 3 shows the evolution of the annual average inward investment cost for the nine coun-
tries. By and large, implied costs have fallen over time even at constant risk tolerance. For
two countries, Germany and Spain, implied costs were rising until the late eighties before the
downward trend started; possibly, what we really see is not increased home bias due to rising
costs but to proportionally large privatizations that strongly targeted the local small investor.
Sweden's exceptionally high initial cost re°ected capital controls, lifted in the later eighties;
we see costs duly plummet as of then. Japan is a lone outsider, with the imputed cost of
inward investments rising as its market slumped in the ¯rst half of the 1990s. Lastly, and most
crucially, also CK style cost estimates for 2001-04 are falling, and their levels seem to be well
in line with the general trend of the 1990s.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper we use actual portfolio holdings to estimate the implicit costs for an investor
to diversify internationally. This integrates the work of Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) on costs
of investments with the studies of determinants of international capital °ows and yields a
methodology that allows us to estimate the costs on inward and outward investment, their
determinants, and the universal risk tolerance parameter simultaneously. We also account for
interaction e®ects between two countries. The technology is applied to a fairly wide cross
section of countries, 36 of them, over four years. We also apply the original CK algorithm to
a smaller cross section of nine countries over 19 years.
One ¯nding is that, consistent with earlier results of CK, Adler and Dumas (1983) and CoÄ en
(2001), in°ation hedging plays no big role in explaining the home bias puzzle. We also ¯nd that
the implicit costs to invest in less developed countries are substantially higher than the costs to
invest in developed countries. Thus, investors ¯nd early-stage countries too costly, even taking
into account the advantages of low correlation with major markets and the positive skewness
in the returns of emerging countries. These countries typically have less developed ¯nancial
markets, a lower GDP, and higher in°ation and unemployment rates than the industrialized
countries. They are also more likely to have su®ered from a ¯nancial crisis. Most emerging
countries have underdeveloped information channels and procedures, which can increase the
24costs for both residents and foreigners to acquire information on certain companies, resulting
in a total cost of foreign investment that is far higher than the explicit costs that are actually
charged (transaction costs, withholding taxes). Indeed, while most information-related coef-
¯cients are signi¯cant with signs that make sense, this is far less the case with the cash-cost
variables; thus, information and ¯nancial development seems to be the key.
Our estimates of the implicit costs to invest in a developed country, in contrast, are lower than
estimates reported earlier (Cooper and Kaplanis, 1994; CoÄ en, 2001). We show that the implicit
costs have been trending downward over the last two decades, at least for the nine countries
that have data over this period. As a result, foreign investors that enter mainstream markets
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Thailand
A2. Composition of the capital control indices
The AREAER capital account transactions are subdivided into fourteen categories. Following
Miniane (2004), we add a ¯fteenth category. For each of the subdivisions, it is noted if there
are capital controls on in°ows and/or on out°ows. We construct the indices of controls on
26in°ows and on out°ows by using a dummy with a unit value if a capital control is present in
the category and zero otherwise.
The capital account transactions are subdivided the following categories:
- Capital market securities: shares or other securities of a participating nature
- Capital market securities: bonds or other debt securities
- Money market instruments
- Collective investment securities
- Derivatives and other instruments
- Commercial credit operations
- Financial credit operations
- Guarantees, suretees, and ¯nancial backup facilities
- Direct investment
- Liquidation of direct investment (only for out°ows)
- Real estate transactions
- Personal capital transactions
- Commercial banks and other credit institutions
- Institutional investors
The ¯fteenth category accounts for the presence of multiple exchange rate regimes.
A3. Estimates of the annual percentage cost of international investment
Each column of Table IV corresponds to the country of investment (host country), each row to
an investing country (home country). For example, the second entry of the ¯rst row says that
an Austrian investor faces an implicit investment cost of 0.55 per cent per annum to invest in
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